14 May RACIALISM
Racialism
Shelby anticipates the following question toward the end of his article, “Shouldnt we reject black solidarity and embrace interracial, anti-racist solidarity instead?”
(a) Explain what this question means (e.g., explain what ‘black solidarity as well as ‘interracial solidarity mean in this context).
(b) How does Shelby respond to this rhetorical question/challenge? Are his arguments here persuasive? Offer some critical discussion (e.g., Which is the strongest consideration? What does his discussion establish? Can his arguments be strengthened?)
(c) Briefly consider how this exchange between Shelby and his imagined interlocutor would be different (if at all) if the question posed had been, “Shouldnt we reject black solidarity and embrace an interracial solidarity movement against anti-black racism?”
Guidelines:
Your paper should be no longer than 4 pages (and not under 3 pages).
Your paper should be spell-checked and proofread for grammatical correctness.
Use 12pt font, Times New Roman, and double-spacing.
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Ethics 112 (January 2002): 231266
! 2002 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2002/11202-
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231
Foundations of Black Solidarity: Collective
Identity or Common Oppression?*
Tommie Shelby
We are one with you under the ban of prejudice and proscription—
one with you under the slander of inferiority—one with you
in social and political disfranchisement. What you suffer, we suffer;
what you endure, we endure. We are indissolubly united, and must
fall or flourish together. [Frederick Douglass]1
In an effort to liberate blacks from the burden of racial oppression,
black leaders have frequently called on black Americans to become a
more unified collective agent for social change.2 And while there are
* Sincere and warm thanks go to my friends and colleagues who commented on
previous drafts of this essay, including Linda Alcoff, Anthony Appiah, Lawrie Balfour, Sylvia
Berryman, Martha Biondi, Bernard Boxill, Derrick Darby, Dan Farrell, Dena Gilby, Robert
Gooding-Williams, Jennifer Hochschild, Bill Lawson, Sarah Loper, Ron Mallon, Howard
McGary, Charles Mills, Lucius Outlaw, Naomi Pabst, John Pittman, Diana Raffman, Kathleen
Schmidt, and Laurence Thomas. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer
for Ethics, as well as the editors of the journal. Earlier versions of the essay were presented
at Howard University, Harvard University, the Du Bois Scholars Institute in New Jersey,
the Collegium for African American Research Biannual Conference, and a special session
of the APA Pacific sponsored by the Committee on Blacks in Philosophy. I am grateful to
the audiences at these venues.
1. Frederick Douglass, “To Our Oppressed Countrymen,” in Black Nationalism in America,
ed. John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,
1970), p. 58, originally published as an editorial in the North Star (December 3, 1847).
2. In everyday life, use of the term ‘black when referring to individuals or groups
rarely causes much confusion; context is usually enough to make the speakers meaning
relatively clear. But the concept “black” is quite vague and thus is not easily accommodated
to theoretical discourse where one would like to be fairly precise. Moreover, the meaning
of ‘black as a “racial” designator varies with social context, for there are various systems
of racial classification around the world; and even within a given locale, who is “black”
may shift with political contingencies. My concern in this essay is primarily with blacks
living in the United States today, including recent African, Caribbean, European, and
Latin American immigrants, though some of what I say here can also be extended to
blacks living in other places as well. For the moment, I will rely on context to set the
232 Ethics January 2001
some who think such solidarity irrational, impractical, or perhaps even
morally objectionable,3 I take it that many people (both black and nonblack)
believe it to be essential for black people to achieve the full
freedom and social equality that American ideals promise. However,
even among those who agree that black solidarity is important for bringing
about racial justice, there is substantial disagreement over the precise
meaning of this solidaristic commitment. Such disagreement can be
quite fundamental, as can be seen by comparing the following two views
on the scope and significance of black political solidarity:
Common oppression theory: Blacks should unite and work together
because they suffer a common oppression; and they can
overcome or ameliorate their shared condition only through black
solidarity.
Collective self-determination theory: Blacks should unite and work
together because they are an oppressed people, a people with their
own distinctive racial, ethnic, cultural, and/or national identity;
and as a people, blacks have interests that are best served by their
becoming a self-determining group.
Though they are somewhat similar in underlying motivation, the
two political theories are importantly different. The common oppression
theory, the least radical of the two, simply acknowledges the existence
of antiblack racism in America and calls on those who suffer under it
to act collectively to end that oppression or at least to reduce its impact
on their lives. The goal of this political program, then, is to free blacks
from antiblack racism, and it sees black solidarity as a necessary means
to that end. The collective self-determination theory, on the other hand,
is a form of black nationalism, and it maintains that blacks need to work
together to bring about their collective self-realization as a people. Generally
more pessimistic about the prospects for ending antiblack racism,
this program seeks relief for black people through collective autonomy
(political, economic, social, and/or cultural) and calls for black solidarity
to bring this about.
My concern in this essay is primarily with the status of the common
oppression theory, for while it is sometimes misunderstood or outright
rejected, it is a position that I believe blacks should embrace (and of
meaning of the term ‘black, but in the section titled “Varieties of ‘Black Social Identity,”
I will urge a more precise conception of “blackness.” My reasons for choosing ‘black
rather than, say, ‘African-American, ‘Afro-American, or ‘person of color will also become
clearer in that section.
3. See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Racisms,” in Anatomy of Racism, ed. David Theo
Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Randall Kennedy, “My Race
Problem—and Ours,” Atlantic Monthly (May 1997): 5566; and Paul Gilroy, Against Race:
Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2000).
Shelby Foundations of Black Solidarity 233
course some already do). Though the collective self-determination theory,
with its goal of black collective self-realization, certainly has its adherents,
and it too is worthy of extended critical discussion, I will not
be concerned to take it up here, at least not directly. However, in an
effort to defend and clarify the common oppression theory, and to
further distinguish it from black nationalism, I want to scrutinize a
doctrine that is often thought to be a component of both conceptions
of black solidarity:
Collective identity theory: A collective black identity is essential
for an effective black solidarity whose aim is liberation from racial
oppression; therefore, blacks who are committed to emancipatory
group solidarity must embrace and preserve their distinctive black
identity.
It is perhaps obvious why the advocate of black collective self-determination
would embrace this view, since it is the distinctive social
identity of blacks that, on this account, constitutes them as a “people.”
Without such an identity, the goal of black collective self-realization loses
its rationale and much of its appeal. But even for those who accept the
more modest common oppression theory, collective identity theory may
seem to have much going for it, as it would appear to help with overcoming
two serious obstacles to black collective action against antiblack
racism. First, there is the familiar free-rider problem. While some blacks
are willing to make the relevant sacrifices to bring about racial equality,
others are much more complacent and narrowly self-interested. The
inaction of the latter weakens the collective effort, and it breeds resentment
and suspicion among blacks, as some are seen as benefiting
from the sacrifices of others without contributing anything of substance
to the collective struggle. Collective identity theory suggests a (partial)
solution: by cultivating a common conception of who they are as black
people, blacks can strengthen the bonds of sympathy and loyalty that
will enable them to overcome these barriers to collective action. Such
an identity could also give blacks a firmer basis for mutual identification
across class lines, something that is thought to be sorely needed in this
time of increasing intraracial economic stratification. Second, there is
the general problem that the mere acceptance of abstract principles of
justice is often insufficient to motivate people to contribute the time
and resources necessary for effecting meaningful social change. This
difficulty affects the collective will of blacks as well, despite the fact that
they, perhaps more than any other racialized group in America, desperately
want to see an end to racial oppression. Again, the collective
identity theory seems to help: viewing each other as “black brothers and
sisters” with a shared social identity may, like the familiar motivating
234 Ethics January 2001
force of kinship relations, make blacks more inclined to help each other
in a movement to end racial subordination and inequality.
Many influential theorists in the history of black political thought
have defended or relied upon the collective identity theory. The tendency
to tie emancipatory black solidarity to the need for a collective
black identity can be found in the writings and speeches of such diverse
thinkers as Edward Blyden, Alexander Crummell, W. E. B. Du Bois,
Marcus Garvey, Alain Locke, Malcolm X, Amiri Baraka, Harold Cruse,
Stokely Carmichael, Maulana Karenga, Molefi Asante, and Lucius Outlaw.
4 For purposes of illustrating this tendency, I will focus on Du Bois
and his well-known essay, “The Conservation of Races.” In that essay,
Du Bois explicitly advocates a particularly strong form of emancipatory
black solidarity: “It is our [the American Negroes] duty to conserve our
physical powers, our intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a
race we must strive by race organization, by race solidarity, by race unity
to the realization of that broader humanity which freely recognizes differences in
men, but sternly deprecates inequality in their opportunities of development.”5
Du Bois believed that black solidarity is necessary for both overcoming
racial oppression and ensuring that blacks make their unique cultural
contribution to humanity. He also insisted that blacks should “conserve”
their racial identity, rather than be absorbed into Anglo-American culture;
for, as he saw it, the goals of emancipatory black solidarity cannot
4. Though not all of these thinkers explicitly defend the collective identity theory,
each at least implicitly relies upon it. Moreover, it is arguable that some of them came to
deemphasize the importance of a collective black identity to black solidarity—e.g., Du
Bois and Malcolm X—which is why I say that the view can be found in their “writings and
speeches.” See Edward W. Blyden, “The Call of Providence to the Descendants of Africa
in America,” in Negro Social and Political Thought, ed.Howard Brotz (NewYork:Basic,1966);
Alexander Crummell, “The Relations and Duties of Free Colored Men in America to
Africa” and “The Race Problem in America,” both in Brotz, ed.; W. E. B. Du Bois, “The
Conservation of Races,” in The Seventh Son: The Thought and Writings of W. E. B. Du Bois,
vol. 1, ed. Julius Lester (New York: Vintage, 1971); Marcus Garvey, “Aims and Objects of
Movement for Solution of Negro Problems,” in Brotz, ed.; Alain Locke, “The New Negro,”
in The New Negro, ed. Alain Locke (New York: Atheneum, 1969);MalcolmX, “BlackMans
History,” in The End of White World Supremacy: Four Speeches by Malcolm X, ed. ImamBenjamin
Karim (New York: Arcade, 1971); LeRoi Jones (Amiri Baraka), “The Legacy of Malcolm
X, and the Coming of the Black Nation,” in his Home: Social Essays (New York: William
Morrow, 1966); Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (New York: William Morrow,
1967); Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation
in America (New York: Vintage, 1967); Maulana Karenga, “Society, Culture, and the Problem
of Self-Consciousness: A Kawaida Analysis,” in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-
American Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harris (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983);
Molefi Kete Asante, The Afrocentric Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998); and
Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., “Against the Grain of Modernity: The Politics of Difference and the
Conservation of ‘Race,” in his On Race and Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1996).
5. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” p. 183; emphasis added.
Shelby Foundations of Black Solidarity 235
be achieved without the preservation of a distinctive black identity: “We
believe it the duty of the Americans of Negro descent, as a body, to
maintain their race identity until this mission of the Negro people is
accomplished, and the ideal of human brotherhood has become a practical
possibility.”6 While it is clear that Du Bois would like to see black
identity preserved even beyond that time when (if ever) social equality
becomes a reality, here he emphasizes the “duty” of blacks to maintain
their identity “until” such equality is realized.
Even in his reconstruction of the concept of “race,” Du Bois emphasized
the link between racial identity and race solidarity: “[A race]
is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language,
always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both
voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain
more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.” 7 Recently, there has been a lively
philosophical debate over the exact meaning of Du Boiss conception
of race as defined in his “Conservation” essay.8 Much of this debate has
focused on the metaphysics of race, that is, on what “races” are, whether
any really exist, and if so, in what sense. Du Bois was no doubt concerned
with such questions, but his interest in the reality of “races” was in part
based on his desire to lay a firm foundation for black solidarity. Du Bois
was convinced that a collective black identity—based primarily on a
shared history and culture, and only secondarily on a common biology—
is a necessary component of an emancipatory black solidarity.
Much of black social thought has followed him in this. Indeed, among
advocates of black solidarity, collective identity theory is often treated
as a truism.
However, I will argue that we should reject this view of black emancipation,
not because black solidarity has no contribution to make to
black liberation, but rather because cultivating a collective black identity
is unnecessary for forging effective bonds among blacks, would create
(or exacerbate an already) undue constraint on individual freedom,
and is likely, in any case, to be self-defeating. I would urge that we
6. Ibid., p. 186; emphasis added.
7. Ibid., p. 178; emphasis added.
8. See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Fathers House: Africa in the Philosophy of
Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 2846; Lucius Outlaw, “On W. E. B.
Du Boiss ‘The Conservation of Races,” in Overcoming Racism and Sexism, ed. Linda A. Bell
and David Blumenfeld (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995); Robert Gooding-
Williams, “Outlaw, Appiah, and Du Boiss ‘The Conservation of Races,” in W. E. B. Du
Bois on Race and Culture, ed. Bernard W. Bell, Emily R. Grosholz, and James B. Stewert
(New York: Routledge, 1996); Tommy L. Lott, The Invention of Race: Black Culture and the
Politics of Representation (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 4766; and Paul C. Taylor,
“Appiahs Uncompleted Argument: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race,” Social Theory
and Practice 26 (2000): 10328.
236 Ethics January 2001
disentangle the call for an emancipatory black solidarity from the call
for a collective black identity. A black solidarity that is based on the
common experience of antiblack racism and the joint commitment to
bringing it to an end can and should play an important role in the fight
against racial injustice. But an emancipatory black solidarity that emphasizes
the need to affirm a racial, ethnic, cultural, and/or national
identity is a legacy of black political thought that must now be abandoned
for the sake of the struggle against racial oppression. Toward the
end of this essay, I will sketch and defend a version of the common
oppression theory that eschews the requirement of a collective black
identity.
Before proceeding further, however, two caveats are in order. First,
my concern in this essay is with that form of group solidarity that has
as its primary goal the liberation of black people from the burdens of
racial inequality and antiblack racism. Thus, for the remainder of this
essay, ‘black solidarity will refer to this type of emancipatory solidarity.
But of course not everything that could rightly be called a form of “black
solidarity” is bound up with antiracist politics, since there are other
collective goals or values that could serve as a basis for building black
unity. For instance, there is a form of black solidarity that has as its end
the nurturing of communal relations among blacks, a solidarity that is
not treated as a means to some other external objective: some may seek
solidarity with other blacks simply because they see intrinsic value in
the social interaction and the feelings of community that it brings. Nothing
I say here should be taken to preclude or disparage this type of
solidarity; the form of emancipatory black solidarity that I would defend
is perfectly compatible with it. Indeed, under certain conditions, the
former may, even without conscious effort, foster the latter and vice
versa. Second, like Du Bois, some blacks might want to work together
to cultivate and preserve “black culture,” because they believe it to be
distinctive, intrinsically valuable, and in danger of being lost or underappreciated;
and, again, they may see this collective project as important
quite apart from its relationship to the struggle against racism. Provided
such a project is not treated as a necessary component of emancipatory
black solidarity, it is not threatened by the rejection of the collective
identity theory. However, if blacks are thought to have an obligation to
commit themselves to this goal of cultural conservation, then the project
will be vulnerable to some of the criticisms I will raise against collective
identity theory below.
GROUP SOLIDARITY
Before submitting it to critical scrutiny, it will be useful to specify the
collective identity theory in a bit more detail. This will involve two tasks:
explaining the meaning of “blackness” and describing the requirements
Shelby Foundations of Black Solidarity 237
of “solidarity.” I will take up the latter task first. I want to suggest that
there are four core characteristics that are jointly sufficient for a robust
form of group solidarity. By “robust” here I mean a solidarity that is
strong enough to move people to collective action, and not just a mutual
sympathy born of the recognition of commonality or a feel-good sense
of group belonging.9
Identification between group members.—One of the more salient characteristics
of group solidarity is the tendency of group members to identify
with each other or with the group as a whole. The basis of mutual
identification can vary greatly. It can, for example, be based on a shared
ethnic or cultural heritage (whether real or imagined). But its basis may
also be the fact that group members believe themselves to share a similar
plight or some significant, perhaps life-shaping, experience. Such commonality
often engenders mutual empathetic understanding. This kind
of understanding is not, however, merely a matter of sympathy, which
may be nothing more than an involuntary reaction to the plight of
others. Rather, members of a solidarity group come to view themselves,
because of what they have in common, as sharing a special bond; and
because of this bond, sometimes fellow group members are treated as
if they were an extension of the self, so that one may feel pride when
a member of the group does something praiseworthy or shame when
a fellow member does something embarrassing, almost as if one had
done the deed oneself. It is mutual identification that accounts for this
familiar sense of “we-ness” that is so characteristic of solidarity groups.
Shared values or goals.—Members of a solidarity group share a set of
values and/or goals, and each knows (or at least believes) that fellow
group members are committed to these. The values or goals might take
the form of more or less vague ideals (e.g., “Africa for the Africans” or
“Black Power”), specific policies or principles (e.g., civil disobedience
or equal opportunity for all), or broad social programs (e.g., black
capitalism or the building of a unified African nation-state). Such common
values and/or goals often (at least partially) define the group,
constituting its distinctive character and self-conception.
9. The characteristics of group solidarity that I discuss below are drawn in part from
recent work in social psychology on group cohesiveness, especially from the social identity
and self-categorization approaches. I take it that these characteristics are intuitive and
relatively uncontroversial. Moreover, they are compatible with a variety of social psychological
approaches to group behavior. See, e.g., John C. Turner, Rediscovering the Social
Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); Michael A. Hogg and Dominic
Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes
(London: Routledge, 1988); Michael A. Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness:
From Attraction to Social Identity (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Tom R. Tyler,
Roderick M. Kramer, and Oliver P. John, eds., The Psychology of the Social Self (Mahwah,
N.J.: Erlbaum, 1999).
238 Ethics January 2001
Group loyalty.—One of the most important components of solidarity
is group loyalty. Loyalty to ones group entails allowing the group to
figure significantly in the construction of ones projects and life plans.
This will involve, perhaps among other things, faithfulness to the groups
values, principles, and ideals, and a willingness to exert extra effort to
help members of the group and to advance the groups interests. Moreover,
group loyalty is always (at least somewhat) exclusionary and is often
defined in opposition to some other group(s), that is, there is usually
an “Us” and a “Them,” or, if you like, an in-group and an out-group.
Members of a solidarity group show loyalty to in-group members as
opposed to those of the relevant out-group, whose interests, goals, or
values may differ from or conflict with those of the in-group. Though
it does require that one be willing to resist threats to ones group created
by its enemies, the partiality that loyalty engenders need not be adversarial.
Peaceful coexistence, even coalition, between different solidarity
groups is often possible.
Mutual trust.—Group solidarity also requires that group members
trust one another, for mutual trust is the foundation of cooperation.
Because of the vulnerability to exploitation that loyalty engenders, wellfounded
trust is necessary to give group members some measure of
security. Each must have reason to believe that the others will not let
him down, betray the values of the group, or free-ride on the sacrifices
of his fellows. Mutual trust enables members of the group to act collectively
to achieve group goals, especially when success is uncertain.
There are many examples of solidarity groups: families, labor unions,
fraternities and sororities, some ethnic groups, religious organizations,
political parties, police officers, street gangs, military personnel,
and organized crime syndicates. Rather than focus on any of these quite
complicated (and, with some of these, problematic) forms of solidarity,
a simpler and more suitably paradigmatic case is the solidarity between
members of a sports team. Players on a sports team often identify with
each other. When they do, each thinks in terms of “we” rather than “I.”
When the team wins a game, all rejoice in victory, and when it loses,
everyone suffers “the agony of defeat,” no matter how much or little
each may have contributed to the victory or loss. Such sports teams will
also be jointly committed to a set of values or goals. For example, they
may be committed to fair play and sportsmanship, a particular style of
play, or a win-at-all-costs philosophy. Team solidarity also requires that
each be loyal to the groups values and to her teammates. So, for instance,
members of the team will work hard during practice sessions,
stick to agreed-upon game plans, put aside individual goals when pursuing
them would conflict with the good of the team, and expend as
much effort as is necessary for the team to win—the sports cliche´s “110
percent.” Finally, members of a sports team must trust one another,
Shelby Foundations of Black Solidarity 239
especially if they are to be successful at winning. Each must feel confident
that her teammates will perform their designated roles on the
team; and each must know that if she makes an honest mistake that
costs the team a game, her teammates will support her with words of
encouragement, rather than berate and blame her. Such trust is often
built by mutual displays of individual loyalty to the team or by repeatedly
struggling together against formidable opponents.
To briefly summarize: robust group solidarity exists whenever a set
of individuals identify with each other, are jointly committed to certain
values or goals, are loyal to the group and its members, and trust one
another. Thus, black solidarity would be robust if blacks, as a group,
were to possess each of these four characteristics.
VARIETIES OF “BLACK” SOCIAL IDENTITY
According to collective identity theory, black people must embrace and
preserve their distinctive black identity if a politically progressive solidarity
is to flourish among them. To fully understand this position, then,
we also need to know what group of people ‘black is supposed to be
picking out here, and what the nature of this “black identity” is that
they must embrace and preserve. I want to approach these two questions
by making a distinction between “thin” and “thick” conceptions of black
identity. Relying on this distinction, we will see, among other things,
that the collective identity theorist urges the cultivation of a thick black
identity.
On a thin conception of black identity, “black” is a vague and socially
imposed category of difference that serves to distinguish groups on the
basis of their members having certain visible, inherited physical characteristics,
and/or a particular biological ancestry. The prevailing thin
conception of black identity in the United States holds that blacks are
those persons who have such inherited physical traits as dark skin, tightly
curled or “kinky” hair, a broad flat nose, and thick lips, and/or those
persons who are descendants of people that are presumed to have such
characteristics. Thus, on a thin view, blacks are persons who (more or
less) fit a certain phenotypic profile and/or who are thought to have
biological ancestors that fit the relevant profile.
For those who meet the criterion, there is little room for choice;
you cannot simply decide not to be thinly black—as the African American
saying goes, “The only thing I have to do is stay black and die.” If,
say, one were to assimilate completely to so-called white culture, ones
thin blackness would nevertheless remain intact, for cultural conversion
provides no escape. No amount of wealth or social status can erase ones
thin blackness—though clearly ones class status might mitigate some
of its negative consequences. One might alter her physical appearance
so as not to “look black,” or if she does not have a “black appearance,”
240 Ethics January 2001
she might simply conceal her black ancestry—as those who “pass”
do—but in either case, she would still be black, in the thin sense, even
if never found out. It is an individuals thin blackness that makes her
vulnerable to antiblack racism despite her nonblack physical appearance,
her law-abiding conduct and good character, her class position or
professional status, or the extent of her assimilation to the dominant
“white” culture.10
A thick conception of black identity (which usually includes a thin
criterion as a component part) always requires something more (or
something other) than a common physical appearance or shared ancestry.
11 Here, the social category “black” has a narrower social meaning,
with specific and sometimes quite demanding criteria for who qualifies
as black. Drawing on the history of black social thought, four familiar
versions of thick blackness can be distinguished.
First, relying on K. Anthony Appiahs terminology, there is the
racialist conception of blackness.12 On this conception, black identity is
based on the supposed presence of a special genotype in the biological
make-up of all (fully) black people that does not exist among nonblacks.
On this view, an underlying cluster of genes, transmitted through reproduction,
accounts not only for the relatively superficial physical traits
that constitute thin blackness but also for more socially significant traits,
such as temperament, aesthetic sensibility, and certain innate talents;
and it is the possession of this genotype that defines membership in the
black race. There is of course a racialist conception of blackness that
is committed to the view that biological race determines native intelligence,
reproductive traits and tendencies, and moral character. However,
since this strong form of racial determinism is widely accepted as
false and racially offensive, I will assume that our collective identity
theorist does not endorse it.
Second, there is the ethnic conception of blackness. It treats black
identity as a matter of shared ancestry and common cultural heritage.13
On such an account, there is no assumption that two people of the
same ethnicity must necessarily share the same “racial essence.” To be
sure, the members of an ethnic group may share certain physical traits
10. For a similar conception of blackness, see Bernard R. Boxill, Blacks and Social
Justice, rev. ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), p. 178.
11. Those thick conceptions that require something other, rather than just something
more, than thin criteria for blackness will entail, if only implicitly, a critique and rejection
of the thin criteria.
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