13 Jun CHOOSE ONE OF THE PRIMARY SOURCES WE HAVE READ UNTIL OCTOBER 6TH. WRITE A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE HISTORICAL PERIOD.
Germany and the Next War
Friedrich von Bernhardi
The Right to Make War
Since 1795, when Immanuel Ka;it published in his
old age his treatise on “Perpetual Peace,” many have
considered it an established fact that war is the destruction
of all good and the origin of all evil. In
spite of all that history teaches, no conviction is felt
that the struggle between nations is inevitable, and
the growth of civilization is credited with a power to
which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such
human theories and the change of times, war has
again apd again marched from country to country
with the clash of arms, and has proved its destructive
as well as creative and purifying power. It has
not succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature
is. Long periods of war, far from convincing
men of the necessity of war, have, on the contrary,
always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible,
from the political intercourse of nations.
This wish and this hope are widely disseminated
even to-day. The maintenance of peace is lauded as
the only goal at which statesmanship should aim.
This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our
days a quite peculiar power over men’s spirits. This
aspiration finds its public expression in peace
leagues and peace congresses; the Press of every
country and of every party opens its columns to it.
The current in this direction is, indeed, so strong that
the majority of Governments profess—outwardly, at
any rate—that the necessity of maintaining peace is
the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks
out the aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all
Governments exert themselves, partly in reality,
partly in pretence, to extinguish the conflagration.
From: Friedrich von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War,
trans. Allen H. Powles (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1914), pp. 16-19, 86,103-104,169-170,172-175.
Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive
of their action. They usually employ the need of
peace as a cloak under which to promote their own
political aims. This was the real position of affairs at
the Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning
of the action of the United States of America, who in
recent times have earnestly tried to conclude treaties
for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and
foremost with England, but also with Japan, France,
and Germany. No practical results, it must be said,
have so far been achieved.
We can hardly assume that a real love of peace
prompts these efforts. This is shown by the fact that
precisely those Powers which, as the weaker, are exposed
to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest
need of international protection, have been completely
passed over in the American proposals for
Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be assumed
that very matter-of-fact political motives led
the Americans, with their commercial instincts, to
take such steps, and induced “perfidious Albion” to
accede to the proposals. We may suppose that England
intended to protect her rear in event of a war
with Germany, but that America wished to have a
free hand in order to follow her policy of sovereignty
in Central America without hindrance, and to carry
out her plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive
interests of America. Both countries certainly
entertained the hope of gaining advantage over the
other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the
lion’s share for themselves. Theorists and fanatics
imagine that they see in the efforts of President Taft
a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace,
and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister
for Foreign Affairs in England, with well-affected
idealism, termed the procedure of the United States
an era in the history of mankind.
This desire for peace has rendered most civilized
nations anemic, and marks a decay of spirit and
265
266 Part Ten • World War I
political courage such as has often been shown by a
race of Epigoni. “It has always been,” H. von
Treitschke tells us, “the weary, spiritless, and exhausted
ages which have played with the dream of
perpetual peace.”
Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the
endeavours to diminish the dangers of war and to
mitigate the sufferings which war entails are justifiable.
It is an incontestable fact that war temporarily
disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic development,
brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes
the primitive brutality of man. It is therefore
a most desirable consummation if wars for trivial reasons
should be rendered impossible, and if efforts are
made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily in
the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential
nature of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress
has accomplished in this limited sphere deserves,
like every permissible humanization of war, universal
acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the
object is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary
place in historical development.
This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the
great universal laws which rule all life. War is a biological
necessity of the first importance, a regulative
element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed
with, since without it an unhealthy development
will follow, which excludes every advancement
of the race, and therefore all real civilization. “War
is the father of all things.” The sages of antiquity
long before Darwin recognized this.
The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature,
the basis of all healthy development. All existing
things show themselves to be the result of contesting
forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not merely
the destructive, but the life-giving principle. “To supplant
or to be supplanted is the essence of life,” says
Goethe, and the strong life gains the upper hand.
The law of the stronger holds good everywhere.
Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves
the most favourable conditions of life, and to
assert themselves in the universal economy of Nature.
The weaker succumb. This struggle is regulated
and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological
laws and by the interplay of opposite forces. In the
plant world and the animal world this process is
worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human
race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by
social ordinances. The man of strong will and strong
intellect tries by every means to assert himself, the
ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the individual
is far from being guided merely by the consciousness
of right. The life-work and the life-struggle of
many men are determined, doubtless, by unselfish
and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent the less
noble passions—craving for possessions, enjoyment
and honour, envy and the thirst for revenge—
determine men’s actions. Still more often, perhaps, it
is the need to live which brings down even natures of
a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence
and enjoyment.
There can be no doubt on this point. The nation
is made up of individuals, the State of communities.
The motive whch influences each member is prominent
in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for
possessions, power and sovereignty, which primarily
governs the relations of one nation to another, and
right is respected so far only as if is compatible with
advantage. So long as there are men who have
human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are
nations who strive for an enlarged sphere of activity,
so long will conflicting interests come into being and
occasions for making war arise.
“The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can
be reduced, is the law of struggle. All intr’asocial
property, all thoughts, inventions, and institutions,
as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the
intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another
is cast out. The extrasocial, the supersocial
struggle which guides the external development of
societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal development,
the intrasocial struggle, is man’s daily
work—the struggle of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences,
activities. The outward development, the supersocial
struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of
nations—war. In what does the creative power of
this struggle consist? In growth and decay, in the victory
of the one factor and in the defeat of the other!
This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates.”
>:* >!•
We see the European Great Powers divided into
two great camps.
On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have
concluded a defensive alliance, whose sole objecris
to guard against hostile aggression. In this alliance
BERNHARDI Germany and the Next W ar 267
the two first-named States form the solid, probably
unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they
are intimately connected. The ‘geographical conditions
force this result. The two States combined
form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic
to the North Sea and the Baltic.
55- 5^
Under these conditions the position of Germany
is extraordinarily difficult. We not only require for
the full material development of our nation, on a
scale corresponding to its intellectual importance,
an extended political basis, but, as explained in the
previous chapter, we are compelled to obtain space
for our increasing population and markets for our
growing industries. But at every step which we take
in this direction England will resolutely oppose us.
English policy may not yfet have made the definite
decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, by all
and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder
every further expansion of German international influence
and of German maritime power. The recognized
political aims of England and the attitude of
the English Government leave no doubt on this
point. But if we were involved in a struggle with England,
we can be quite sure that France would not
neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank.
Italy, with her extensive coast-line, even if still a
member of the Triple Alliance, will have to devote
large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off
the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean
Fleet, and would thus be only able to employ
weaker forces against France. Austria would be paralyzed
by Russia; against the latter we should have
to leave forces in the East. We should thus have to
fight out the struggle against France and England
practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps
with some support from Italy. It is in this double
menace by sea and on the mainland of Europe that
the grave danger to our political position lies, since
all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion
barred.
Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation
of the international question, necessary
and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may.
Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment,
though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful
means so far. On the one hand it is being waged by
the competition in trade, industries and warlike
preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic
methods with which the rival States are fighting each
other in every region where their interests clash.
With these methods it has been possible to maintain
peace hitherto, but not without considerable loss
of power and prestige. This apparently peaceful state
of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden,
but none the less formidable, crisis—perhaps the most
momentous crisis in the history of the German nation.
We have fought in the last great wars forour national
union and our position among the Powers of
Europe; we now must decide whether we wish to develop
into and maintain a World Empire, and procure
for German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition
which has been hitherto withheld from them.
Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal?
Are we prepared to make the sacrifices which such
an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we willing to
recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step
lower in our economic, political, and national importance?
That is what is involved in our decision.
“To be, or not to be,” is the question which is put
to us to-day, disguised, indeed, by the apparent equi-‘
librium of the opposing interests and forces, by the
deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official peaceaspirations
of all the States; but by the logic of history
inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with
clear gaze beyond the narrow horizon 6f the day* and
the mere surface of things into the region of realities.
There is no standing still in the world’s history.
All is growth and development. It is obviously impossible
to keep thingsTn the status quo, as diplomacy
has so often attempted. No true statesman will
ever seriously count on such a possibility; he will
only make the outward and temporary maintenance
of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain
time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot
see what is the trend of events. He will use such
diplomatic means only as inferior tools; in reality he
will only reckon with actual forces and with the
powers of a continuous development.
We must make it quite clear to ourselves that
there can be no standing still, no being satisfied for
us, but only progress or retrogression, and that it is
tantamount.
}:• >’f
268 Part Ten • World War I
Since the crucial point is to safeguard our muchthreatened
position on the continent of Europe, we
must first of all face the serious problem of the land
war—by what means we can hope to overcome the
great numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority
will certainly exist if Italy ceases to be an
active member of the Triple Alliance, whether nominally
belonging to it, or politically going over to Irredentism.
The preparations for the naval war are of
secondary importance.
The first essential requirement, in case of a war
by land, is to make the total fighting strength of the
nation available for war, to educate the entire youth
of the country in the use of arms, and to make universal
service an existing fact.
The system of universal service, born in the hour
of need, has by a splendid development of strength
liberated us from a foreign yoke, has in long years of
peace educated a powerful and well-armed people,
and has brought us victory upon victory in the German
wars of unification. Its importance for the social
evolution of the nation has been discussed in a separate
chapter. The German Empire would to-day have
a mighty political importance if we had been loyal to
the principle on which our greatness was founded.
France has at the present day a population of
some 40,000,000; Russia in Europe, with Poland
and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000.
Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000
inhabitants. But since the Russian military forces
are, to a great extent, hampered by very various
causes and cannot be employed at any one time or
place, and are also deficient in military value, a German
army which corresponded to the population
would be certainly in a: position to defend itself successfully
against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely
on the inner line, even though England took
part in the war.
Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal
to the idea of universal military service, and
have apparently definitely discontinued to carry it
out effectively. The country where universal service
exists is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked
about, but it is only kept up in pretence, for in reality
50 per cent., perhaps, of the able-bodied are
called up for training. In particular, very little use
has been made of the larger towns as recruitinggrounds
for the army.
In this direction some reorganization is required
which will energetically combine the forces of the
nation and create a real army, such as we have not at
the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand, we
shall not long be able to hold our own against the
hostile Powers.
Although we recognize this necessity as a national
duty, we must not shut our eyes to the fact
that it is impossible in a short time to make up our
deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased
by 150,000 men. The necessary training
staff and equipment would not be forthcoming, and
on the financial side the required expenditure could
not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of
an increased army only begins to be gradually felt
when the number of reservists and Landwehr is correspondingly
raised. We can therefore only slowly
recur to the reinforcement of universal service. The
note struck by the new Five Years Act cannot be justified
on any grounds. But although we wish to increase
our army on a more extensive scale, we must
admit that, even if we strain our resources, the
process can only work slowly, and that we cannot
hope for a long time to equalize even approximately
the superior forces of our opponents.
We must not, therefore, be content merely to
strengthen our army; we must devise other meins of
gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These means
can only be found in the spiritual domain.
History teaches us by countless examples that
numbers in themselves have only been the decisive
factor in war when the opponents have been equally
matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the
one party exceeds the proportion required by the numerical
law.
*
In a future European war “masses” will be employed
to an extent unprecedented in any previous
one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness will exceed
all previous experience, ^ o re effective and varied
means of communication will be available than
were known in earlier wars. These three momentous
factors will mark the war of the future.
“Masses” signify in themselves an increase of
strength, but they contain elements of weakness as
well. The larger they are and the less they can be
commanded by professional soldiers, the more
BERNHARDI Germany and the Next War 269
their tactical efficiency diminishes. The less they are
able to live on the country during vi?ar-time, especially
when concentrated, and the more they are
therefore dependent on the daily renewal of foodsupplies,
the slower and less mobile they become.
Owing to the great space which they require for
their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to
bring them into effective action simultaneously.
They are also far more accessible to morally depressing
influences than compacter bodies of troopsj
and may prove dangerous to the strategy of their
own leaders, if supplies run short, if discipline
breaks down, and the commander loses his authority
over the masses which he can only rule under
regulated conditions.
The increased effectiveness of weapons does not
merely imply a longer range, but a greater deadliness,
and therefore makes more exacting claims on
the morale of the soldier. The danger zone begins
sooner than formerly; the space which must be
crossed in an attack has become far wider; it must be
passed by the attacking party creeping or running.
The soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations,
during which he is exposed to a far hotter
fire than formerly; while under all circumstances he
must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing
which the troop encounters increases the losses
at every incautious movement. All branches of arms
have to suffer under these circumstances. Shelter and
supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In
short, while the troops on the average have diminished
in value, the demands made on them have become
considerably greater.
Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate
the handling and feeding of large masses, but
tie them down to railway systems and main roads,
and must, if they fail or break down in the course of
a campaign, aggravate the difficulties, because the
troops were accustomed to their use, and the commanders
counted upon them.
The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections
is that a great superiority must rest with the
troops whose fighting capabilities and tactical efficiency
are greater than those of their antagonists.
The commander who can carry out all operations
quicker than the enemy, and can concentrate and
employ greater masses in a narrow space than they
can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically
superior force in the decisive direction; if he
controls the more effective troops, he will gain decisive
successes against one part of the hostile army,
and will be able to exploit them against other divisions
of it before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages
in other parts of the field.
Since the tactical efficiency and the morale of the
troops are chiefly shown in the offensive, and are
then most needful, the necessary conclusion is that
safety only lies in offensive warfare.
In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements
of moral strength which it brings into play,
depends chiefly on rapidity of action. Inasmuch as
the attacking party determines the direction of the
attack to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected
spot to collect a superior force against his
surprised opponent. The initiative, which is the
privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time
and place which is very profitable in operations and
tactics. The attacked party can only equalize this
advantage if he has early intimation of the intentions
of the assailant, and has time to take measures
which hold out promise of success. The more rapidly,
therefore, the attacking General strikes his
blow and gains his success, and the more capable
his troops, the greater is the superiority which the
attack in its nature guarantees.
This superiority increases with the size of the
masses. If the advancing armies are large and unwieldy,
and the distances to be covered great, it will
be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander
to take proper measures against a surprise
attack. On the other hand, the prospects of success
of the attacking General will be very favourable, especially
if he is in the fortunate position of having
better troops at his disposal.
Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically
weaker a possibility of gaining the victory, even
when other conditions are equal, and all the more so
the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is
impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern
army simultaneously and completely into action. A
victory, therefore, in the decisive direction—the direction,
that is, which directly cuts the arteries of the
opponents—is usually conclusive for the whole
course of the war, and its effect is felt in the most distant
parts of the field of operations. If the assailant,
therefore, can advance in this direction with superior
Z 7 0 Part Ten • World War I
numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy
cannot utilize his numerical superiority, there is a
possibility of an ultimate victory over the arithmetically
stronger army. In conformity to this law,
Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability
and striking strength, had always the
upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in mere
numbers.
No further proof is required that the superiority
of the attack increases in proportion to the rapidity
with which it is delivered, and to the lack of mobility
of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of concealing
one’s own movements and damaging the effective
tactics of the enemy secures an advantage
which, though indirect, is yet very appreciable.
We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order
to secure the superiority in a war of the future under
otherwise equal conditions, it is incumbent on us;
First, during the period of preparation to raise the
tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much
as possible, and especially to develop the means of
concealing the attacking movements and damaging
the enemy’s tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself
to act on the offensive and strike the first blow,
and to exploit the manceuvring capacity of the
troops as much as possible, in order to be superior in
the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has
objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is
exposed to attacks by enemies more powerful than
itself, is bound to act in this sense. It must, before all
things, develop the attacking powers of its army,
since a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive
methods. This principle holds good pre-eminently
for Germany.
First Primary Source Analysis Essay
History 102
Due date: October 6th
Purpose
Analyze and think critically about a historical text.
Prompt
Choose one of the primary sources we have read until October 6th. Write a brief introduction of the
historical period. Develop an argument relating the chosen text to its historical context. Support and
develop your argument with evidence from the text. Finally, develop a possible research question related
to the primary source analyzed.
Suggestions
The Primary Source Analysis Questions will help you in understanding deeply and thoroughly the text.
Use quotations from both the primary source and the textbook to strengthen your evidence.
If you think it will be relevant for your main thesis, you can also develop one point of your argument by
comparing the historical text with other primary sources from the same historical time.
In order to state a possible research question, think about other historical issues that this source could help
in explaining.
Essay structure
Introduction: Historical background and main argument.
Body of the text: Develop the main points of your argument using evidence from the text.
Conclusion: Restate your main argument and suggest a possible research question.
20% – Strength and persuasiveness of argument
20% – Use of evidence to support the argument
20% – Analysis of the source
20% – Knowledge of historical context
15% – Organization/structure and flow of paper
5% – Style and grammar
A+ 97-100
A 93-96
A- 90-92
B+ 87-89
B 83-86
B- 80-82
C+ 77-79
C 73-76
C- 70-72
D+ 67-69
D 60-66
F 0-59
Primary Source Analysis
History 102 – Fall 2015
1. Basic information – Understand what your source is
• What -> What type of source is it? Official documents, art, novels, newspaper article, map,
letter, film, etc.
• When -> When was it created? Identify the historical background: period, place and society in
which the source was created. Identify the specific circumstances in which the source was
created and the broader historical events and process.
• Where -> Where is the source archived? How do you access it?
• Who -> Who created it? Whose voice are we listening to? Identify the author of the source.
Look for his/her background: biographic information, profession, status, class, gender,
ethnicity, etc.
• Why -> Reasons behind the creation of the source. Why do you think the author created this
source?
• Audience -> To whom is the source addressed?
2. Content – Get yourself inside that time
• Facts -> What historical facts do you learn from this source?
• Argument -> It’s the surface of the document, which message is the author trying to convey?
What is he or she trying to persuade a person of?
• Assumption and biases -> Which are the assumption of the author? And his/her biases?
Inevitably there are going to be things that they take as normal and natural, the common
sense of an era.
• Obsessions and anxieties -> What things are people fixating on? Which are the main concerns
of the author?
• Silences à What is the source not saying? Which perspective and questions are left out?
(Often you can understand this by juxtaposing different sources and different kinds of
sources)
3. Relevance of the Source – Produce Knowledge
• Connection with the historical context -> What does this source tell us about its historical
period? Is it useful to understand the period in which it was created? Which are its strengths
and weaknesses?
• Compare with other primary sources -> Is this source in accordance or in contradiction with
other primary sources? How?
• Reliability -> How can we assess the trustworthiness of this source? From what perspective
does it speak?
• Research -> To which research question can this source give answers?
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