Homeland Security Forum Response 312

31 Jul Homeland Security Forum Response 312

Port Facility Operations 

“The terrorist threat in the early twenty-first century is testing the basic political values and structures of democracy, and in particular, criminal justice roles and processes in controlling deviance in society. Terrorism and the emergence of homeland security are changing the character of local policing, not only in the United States, but around the world”…Kenneth Christopher, Port Security Management

 

Port facility security is not the sole responsibility of only one entity. It is the responsibility of many including international, national, state and local organizations including the private sector (Christopher, 2015).

The port authorities often do not have direct control over the following:

· Customs and border protection

· Police, fire, and emergency medical services

· Immigration and agriculture agencies

· Coast Guard and harbor authorities

· Transportation and utility regulating bodies

· Employer groups, stevedores, and labor unions

· Cargo terminal operators

· Passenger cruise and ferry lines

· Vendors, suppliers, and customers

Collaborations between Port Security and Enforcement Operations

This week the focus will be on the security management aspects of port facility operations. As we learned in week six, the security and safety at U.S. ports is no doubt a shared responsibility to ensure that port authorities develop and apply an operational approach that includes various resources, processes, and systems to establish an interconnected port security program. Intra and interagency cooperation is essential to effectively coordinate security efforts between different stake holders conducting port activities. It is important to understand that port facility security is not the sole responsibility of only one entity. It is the responsibility of many including international, national, state and local organizations including the private sector (Christopher, 2015, p. 268).

The changing landscape of criminal activity has forced a change in policing.  Since 9/11, police forces are relied upon, more often than not, to conduct terrorism training, CBRN/WMD training, intelligence gathering (to some extent) and information sharing; along with traditional police roles of crime prevention and follow-on prosecution, public security and assistance.  As with every aspect of our society, this change has encompassed our port security systems as well.  Law enforcement agencies are expected (and needed) to work with port authorities “to integrate the appropriate level of law enforcement service into the Port FSP and security regimen” (Christopher).  Developing mutual Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and/or Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) will help to define each entities’ roles, responsibilities and organizational hierarchy.

When we take a closer look, we soon realize that collaboration between port security and law enforcement operations is critical if both entities want to interact operationally. Although the jurisdictions still remain the same, the port FSO generally has jurisdiction over the respective port.  Whereas, the law enforcement authorities have jurisdiction over their prescribed geographic area. But, seeing as how a port belongs (or is at least geographically located in) a city or county, then it can easily get confusing. There is simply no room for more confusion in an already extremely complex port environment. To properly combat this problem, once again the key is communication. Communication between the heads of each agency and having a collaborative working relationship is crucial to smooth and effective port operations. The Chief of Police of the local law enforcement agency must be able to speak freely and frequently with the Port FSO. It is easy to contemplate the need for having both agencies, but, it’s not the pure simplicity of having more personnel to protect the port.  There are legalities as well that impact how both agencies work and collaborate. For instance, not all violations fall into the realm of the port FSO.  In many cases, the situation must be handled by local law enforcement authorities. Yes, the port security personnel can initially apprehend, but, the specific violations may require the handling of the situation by local, state, or federal law enforcement personnel. This is yet another reason why the two departments should be able to work together in unison as opposed to working against each other. For instance, the local police should always be included in any facility security plan that addresses matters related to administration, legal authority to act, training, joint training and exercise functions and activities, and response and recovery from a natural or manmade disaster or terrorist attack. Together, both parties can work in harmony and establish a secure and safe port (Christopher, 2015).

The threat of terrorism continues to evolve and so does homeland security.  It is imperative that all federal, state and local (in some cases tribal) agencies and authorities are operating on the same page.  Collaboration between all security and law enforcement entities is the key to deter terrorism and criminal activities.  Port security collaboration with law enforcement operations is vital, as port facilities have a major economic impact on towns and the surrounding cities. It is in the best interest of the law enforcement agency to ensure not only the port is safe and protected, but the community surrounding the port is protected as well.  Just as important, and in the best interest of both parties, is to understand one another’s management and organizational structure. This understanding can provide and enhance utilization of both organizations resources when an event or incident occurs.  Trying to train, equip, and organize the port security and law enforcement elements post event will lead to failure and potentially result in increased death and destruction within the port and the surrounding local community.

Challenges of Collaboration in Managing Port Security

Overall, there are three key challenges when working with numerous agencies for one common goal: “resource allocation”, “lack of big-picture” (strategic thinking), and “improving risk communication” (Christopher, 2015).  Communication will always be a big piece when we assess the challenges associated with collaboration. As with any working relationship between differing agencies, there will be challenges to overcome.  The challenges in managing port security operations, as identified by a forum held by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2007 are; “improving risk communications, political obstacles to risk-based resources allocations, and as already mentioned, a lack of strategic thinking about managing homeland security risk” (Christopher, 2015).  What is interesting about the three challenges identified is that they appear to be very similar to the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report on the hijacking of commercial aircraft.  The Commission cited a lack of interagency collaboration in the sharing of information and communications, political issues surrounding command and control, and finally a “lack of imagination” on the part of the government.  However, it appears that the lessons learned from those events have taken root. Progress has been made in the working relationships to counter the terrorist threat and impede criminal activities within the seaport environment.

Port Security and the Dirty Bomb Threat

No discussion on port security challenges is complete without a brief discussion on the so called dirty bomb. The dirty bomb is commonly associated with the technical name, Radiation Dispersal Device or RDD.  The initial idea is that radioactive material would be dispersed (through IED or aerial application) into a target area by the use of explosives with the intent to contaminate the area.  The radioactive material most associated with such an attack would be medical grade material or industrial radioactive waste, not fissile or weapons grade material. Generally, the RDD would be constructed with various radioactive elements such as strontium 90, iodine 131, or cesium 137.  These elements are the most likely candidates for such an attack as they could contaminate large areas with radioactive material.  However, these elements are beta emitters, and beta particles can be stopped by normal clothing. However, they can present a major hazard if inhaled or ingested, resulting in radiation sickness and likely death.

Now the author will opine that this threat is more of a political hype than reality.  Yes, in theory the potential exists.  However, in probability the threat would be low for many reasons. Obtaining enough radioactive material to construct an RDD would be problematic.  Then there is the transportation issue of delivering the RDD to target.  To date, as confirmed by the additional reading for week 6, the Council on Foreign Relations report (2006) on “Dirty Bombs,” there has not been a successful attack utilizing an RDD.  True, there is a lot of talk about testing and threating the use of a dirty bomb…Iraq in 1987 and the Chechen rebels in Moscow in 1995, who planted a device that failed to function (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006).

The RDD threat – the real truth and nothing but the truth

We are exposed to radiation on a daily basis through many means.  However the threat of an RDD accomplishes one of its major goals, fear.  And it is due to this fear that a lot of time and money has been spent to detect, deter and defeat (the objective of any security program) such a threat.   In the last few years a lot of money has been spent not only at our ports but in our local communities as well.  Stabilization teams have been organized and equipped to counter this threat in the local community.  In the political world fear sells, regardless of the reality.  The author is not suggesting that this is not a threat, but is suggesting that it has obtained more attention than it should have, thereby propagating the idea that an RDD is a huge threat within the port environment.

As far as ports and the general public is concerned there are more realistic threats with a higher probability of success.  For example, all the trucks that transport hazardous materials daily from and to the port while traversing through our local city streets. Loads such as ammonium nitrate (fertilizer), chlorine, or strong acids is a common occurrence.  Looking ahead to next week’s lesson 8, we will see what happened to Texas City, Texas when a vessel caught fire and exploded at a dock carrying bulk fertilizer.  Spoiler alert – it flattened the town.  A similar event occurred just a few years back at a processing plant outside of Waco, Texas, when it caught fire and exploded.  Click on the photo below to see the massive power from the fertilizer plant explosion.

Measuring Risk

Michael German, a fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Programs, wrote an article entitled: Is Flawed Terrorism Research driving Flawed Counterterrorism Policies?, which was dated April 7, 2015, and published by The Daily Threat Brief .  The article discusses how the government is continuing to fund research that supports desecrated theories rather than using objective empirical analyses to form policy decisions on counterterrorism defenses.  German uses historical events and the hysteria that led to the internment of Japanese citizens during WWII and the current “modern radicalization theory” to justify the tactics used by the FBI against the American Muslim communities.  “The theory that terrorists incubate through predictable steps from adopting a radical ideology to committing an act of violence has been soundly discredited by empirical studies of terrorists” (German, 2015, p.2). Radicalization does occur, which can lead to violence, such as the Boston Marathon Bombers…this cannot be denied.  But at what cost?

Now what does this have to do with the threat of an RDD in a seaport?  A parallel can be drawn between the governments polices on Islamic extremist radicalization theory and the RDD threat.  It is simple to assume the worst, and formulate all kinds of potential threats without looking at the real probability of the threat occurring or evolving.  The problem is that it is not cost effective to do so.  Limited resources are expended attempting to counter a threat that although is possible, may not be probable.  An effective risk assessment utilizing factual data, capability, availability, intent in conjunction with empirical data could form a low probability of risk.  This is not saying to ignore the risk, but placing it where it belongs with all the other many possibilities that may have a higher probability of causing harm or damage.  But again, in the political world of foreign policy and money spending, “fear” sells, especially to the uninformed public.